Measuring Justice:
NOTES ON FISH, FOUCAULT, AND THE LAw Steven Mailloux M y paper can be described in several ways. It is an illustration of something I call rhetorical hermeneutics: the use of rhetoric to practice theory by doing history (Mailloux 1989) . It is also part of a larger project on Ancients and the Postmodem': an argument that much poststructuralist thought in law, critical theory, and other human sciences can be usefully understood as a contemporary reception of classical Greek rhetoric and philosophy (Shankman 1994 , Mailloux 1995 , Zuckert 1996 . In the following remarks, I suggest how Michel Foucault's genealogical work is both derived from and employed in a reading of Plato and Aristotle on justice. Here I use rhetoric (tracing the trope of measurement) to practice a bit of legal theory (concerning neopragmatism) by doing some reception history (about the law). Specifically, I look at Foucault's genealogy of the will to truth in ancient Greek philosophy and legal practices and relate it to Stanley Fish's theoretical claims about the distinctive purpose of law as a particular social practice aiming to disengage from history to establish formal procedures for legal validity. 1 The trope and argument I use to focus my paper are both conveniently present in a sentence from Plato's Laws: our view it is God, not man, who is pre-eminently the "measure of all things'" (716c). The Platonic question can be stated as follows: Is the measure of justice found in some transcendental realm, beyond human community and history; or, as the Greek Sophist Protagoras had it, is humanity the measure of all things, including justice? 2 Poststructuralist theory generally and neopragmatism in particular answer with the latter, siding with Protagoras against Platonic foundationalism. Fish (1994) by this claim is that law in its judicial functioning aspires to establish foundations for legal justice beyond the contingent and transitory, the personal and political. Fish argues that law makes a 'general effort to disengage itself from history and assumes (in two senses) a shape that time cannot alter' (Fish 1994: 157) . He sees this effort as constituting part of the law)s distinctiveness as a separate practice. Law achieves its independence by 'continually creating and recreating itself out of the very materials and forces [for example) ethics and politics] it is obliged, by the very desire to be law, to push away' (Fish 1994: 156) . Fish argues further that law's effort to maintain and disguise its contradictory performance is an amazing and necessary trick, which he ultimately characterises as 'the story of rhetoric, the art of constructing the (verbal) ground upon which you then confidently walk' (Fish 1994: 170 (Foucault 1965: xi (Foucault 1965: xi The final definition of the Sophist leads us to the point where we can no longer distinguish him from Socrates himself-the ironist working in private by means of brief arguments. Was it not essary to push irony to that extreme? Was it not Plato himself who pointed out the direction for the reversal of Platonism? (Deleuze 1990: 256) In his enthusiastic 1970 review of Deleuze's books, Foucault wrote in tum:
What philosophy has not tried to overturn Platonism? If we defined philosophy at the limit as any attempt, regardless of its source, to reverse Platonism, then philosophy begins with Aristotle; or better yet, it begins with Plato himself, with the conclusion of the Sophist where it is impossible_ to distinguish Socrates from the crafty imitators; or it begins with the Sophists who were extremely vocal about the rise of Platonism and who ridiculed its future greatness with their perpetual play on words (Foucault 1977 ).
Foucault thus argued: 'To pervert Platonism is to side with the Sophists' spitefulness' (Foucault 1977: 168-69 ).
In the same year, on 2 December 1970, Foucault delivered his inaugural lecture at the College de France. 'The Order of Discourse' ratified Foucault's arrival at the pinnacle of French letters, but its rhetorical performance went far beyond its function as an academic ritual. The lecture . ' skilfully wove together a summary of Foucault's past scholarship with an outline of its future direction. This transition in Foucault's thought is usually described as a move from archaeologies of discursive practices to genealogies of powerlknowledge, from structuralist-like accounts of disciplinary statements to socio-political histories of subjects disciplined. Though such characterisations have been questioned, including by Foucault himself, I would claim that 'The Order of Discourse' does mark a tum in Foucault's attitude toward knowledge, a turn that becomes a return to ancient Greek thought by way of a restaging of the Plato/Sophist debate.
For instance, in his lecture Foucault outlines various fOnTIS of exclusion that attempt to contain the power of discourse: one such exclusion is the division between the true and the false, a division 'historically constituted', he claims, in the transition between the Greek poets of the 6th century Be and the philosophers of the 4th. As a result:
The highest truths no longer resided in what discourse was or did, but in what it said: a day came when truth was displaced from the ritualised, efficacious and just act of enunciation, towards the utterance itself, its meaning, its form, its object, its relation to its reference. Between Hesiod and Plato, a certain division was established, separating true discourse from false discourse: a new division because henceforth the true discourse is no longer precious and desirable, since it is no longer the one linked to the exercise of power. The sophist is banished (Foucault in Young 1981: 54) .5
Foucault then declared that in his first series of lectures in 1970-71, it was this 'historical division' that he would first take up: I want to try to discover how this choice of truth, inside which we are caught but which we ceaselessly renew, was made-but also how it was repeated, and displaced. I win consider first the epoch of the Sophists at its beginning, with Socrates, or at least with Platonic philosophy, to see how efficacious discourse, ritual discourse, discourse loaded with powers and perils, gradually came to conform to a division between true and false discourse.
However, in the first lecture series at the College de France, called 'La volonte de savoir', Foucault did not end up focusing on the conflict between Plato and the Sophists. Rather, for what he calls contrasting 'theoretical models of the will to knowledge', he replaced Plato and the Sophists with Aristotle and Nietzsche (Foucault 1977: 199-204) .6
Why the switch? We might conjecture that Foucault's reading of 'measure' in Athenian legal practices and philosophical texts had something to do with the change. Did Foucault see that 'measure' began as a legal and eco-nomic historical tool and then within Plato and Aristotle became first an ideal standard beyond history (God as measure) and then a paradigm of actors who achieve their essential nature, which remains unchanged throughout history (good man as measure)? That is, does Foucault's reading demonstrate the historical validity of Fish's theoretical claim about law's ahistorical, foundationalist aspirations?
Perhaps. In his retrospective summary of the first lecture series, Foucault mentions that his 'analysis of the Aristotelian model essentially derived from a study of the Metaphysics, the Nicomachean Ethics, and De Anima', texts in which the trope of 'measure' plays a prominent role in Aristotle's argument.7 Foucault characterises that argument as one in which the association of truth, pleasure, and sensation provides the framework for privileging the visual sense, which prepares the way for the ultimate pleasure of theoretical knowledge above and beyond the realm of mere human utility.
Foucault asserts that Aristotle makes the link between sensation and pleasure independent of 'the vital utility that might derive from sensation' and uses visual perception as an illustration of this independence. In the only explicit citation of a specific passage, Foucault's course summary refers to the beginning of Aristotle's Metaphysics, which reads:
All men naturally desire knowledge. An indication of this is our esteem for the senses; for apart from their use we esteem them for their own sake, and most of all the sense of sight. Not only with a view to action, but even when no action is contemplated, we prefer sight, generally speaking, to all the other senses. The reason of this is that of all the senses sight best helps us to know things, and reveals many distinctions (Aristotle 1933: 980a).
Foucault comments:
The desire for knowledge, given at the beginning of the Metaphysics as universal and natural, is based on the initial adherence already manifested by sensation; and it assures a smooth passage from this first type of knowledge to the ultimate knowledge that is formulated in philosophy. The intrinsic desire for knowledge in Aristotle relies upon and transposes a prior relationship between knowledge, truth, and pleasure (Foucault 1977: 202) .
Foucault contrasts these Aristotelian notions to Nietzsche's in The Gay
Science: in Aristotle's model of the will to truth, we have hannony, disin-terestedness, and the pleasure of pure knowledge; in Nietzsche's, we have conflict, self-interest, and powerlknowledge shaping subjects' pleasures.
Foucault then uses the Nietzschean model to explain the emergence of the Aristotelian model, history to account for theory, in a move I am duplicating here as I use a speculative history of Foucault's reading to 'explain' Fish's theoretical claim about law. Foucault applied the Nietzschean genealogical method and its model of the will to knowledge in analysing the history and institutions of ancient specifically the 'evolution'
of the 'domain of justice' from the 7th to the 5th century Be (Foucault 1977: 203) . He lists among his topics:
-the search for an equitable measure (not only in commercial exchanges but in the social relationships within a city) through the institution of money;
-the search for a 'nomos', for a just law of distribution to guarantee order within the city, in establishing an order that is the order of the world (Foucault 1977: 204).
Foucault would have found much historical evidence for his story of 'measures' in the Aristotelian texts he read. For example, in a discussion of corrective Aristotle notes that in men's private transactions 'all commodities exchanged must be able to be compared in some way. It is to meet this requirement that men have introduced money; money constitutes in a manner a middle tenn, for it is a measure of all things' (Aristotle Nicomachean Ethics: 1133a).
Foucault's genealogical argument is that these legal and monetary practices involved 'the distribution of justice' in 'important political struggles' and that, among other things, these 'struggles ultimately created a fonn of justice linked to a form of knowledge which presupposes that truth is visible, ascertainable, and measurable'. Furthermore, this truth 'responds to laws similar to those which register the order of the world'. Foucault declares that this 'type of affirmation of truth becomes fundamental in the history of Western knowledge' (Foucault 1977: 204 ). Martin Jay, a reader of both Foucault and Rorty, expands on such claims when he writes:
Once the battle against Sophism, which defended rhetoric and the ear, was won, Greek philosophy could elevate a visually defined notion of disinterested, monologic. epistemic truth over mere opinion or doxa .... The Greek privileging of vision meant more than relegating the other senses to subordinate positions; it could also lead to the denigration of langua$e in several respects. outside of the often maligned tradition of Sophism, language was deemed inferior to sight as the royal road to the truth. It was the realm, as we have noted, of mere doxa (opinion) instead. Rhetoric was thus banished from genuine philosophy (Jay 1993: 26, 186-87) .
Still another way of putting this is to follow Edward Schiappa (1991), Thomas Cole (1991) , and other historians of rhetoric and argue that Plato, in coining the tenn rhetorike in the Gorgias, separated for the first time two activities-rhetoric and philosophy-which the Older Greek Sophists like Protagoras had kept united and equal under the single study of logos.
Stanley Fish follows Rorty, Jay, Schiappa, and Cole not in specific historical detail but in general when he writes about the ongoing conflict between rhetoric and philosophy, between anti-foundationalism and foundationalism, between Protagoras and Plato (Fish 1989: 471-502 ' Humans are the measure of all things, of those that are that they are; and of those that are not, that they are not' (Plato Theaetetus: 152) . 3 What Fish actually writes is that 'there is a sense in which the present essay is not historical; it doesn't do historical work; that is, it does not chart in any detail any of the differently contingent courses the law has taken in the areas it has marked out for its own' (Fish 1994: 178) .
7 See, for example, Metaphysics. l062b-1063a; and Nicomachean Ethics, 11l3a33, 1176a18.
